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A plethora of studies have appeared recently on the value of creative
financing [see Jaffe (1984) for a summary). The typical methodology consists
of calculating a discount ——thepresent value of the interest savings due to
the creative financing ——andincluding this variable, along with other
characteristics of the purchased house, in an hedonic price equation explaining
the house price actually paid. Resulting from this equation is a set of
marginal prices corresponding to each characteristic of the house, including
the units or quantity (discount) of creative finance accompanying the house.
The central questions usually raised is whether the discount is fully
capitalized in the value of the house ——whetherthe price of creative finance
is unity.
In our view, one should not ask what the price of creative finance is
because this price, like that of other housing attributes, likely varies with
supply and demand conditions. In a high interest rate/inflation environment,
many borrowers have short—run affordability problems. Mortgage payments that
will be a minor burden in five years, owing to future nominal income growth,
can be a major burden initially. By providing below—market financing for three
to five years, seller financing, like builder buydowns and graduated payment
mortgages, increases affordability. Similarly, creative financing may allow
low wealth buyers to avoid equity downpayment requirements typically faced in
the conventional market. The "market price" of a specific creative financing
package at any point in time should depend on the ability of the package to
address the affordability and downpayment problems of potential buyers.—2—
Moreover, the market price of a typical creative financing package should vary
over time, depending on the aggregate demand for and supply of seller finance.
When affordability is a major problem overall, creative finance will be in
great demand and its price will be relatively high. In contrast, when the
availability of creative finance increases, buyers are likely to be able to
obtain a given discount for a lower price.2
A prior question to determination of the price or value of creative
finance is measurement of the discount or the quantity of creative finance.
The terms of the seller financing ——initialbalance, contract interest rate
and repayment schedule ——aregenerally known, but the "market" interest rate
to which the contract rate is compared and with which the resultant interest
savings (after—tax) are discounted is not. The appropriate market rate to
employ in the calculation depends on the term, default risk and call risk of
the loan. The coupon on long—term fixed—rate 80% loan—to—value mortgages being
issued at the time of the creative financing, a popular candidate, obviously
pertains to too long a term and contains too large a call premium for virtually
all seller financing deals.1 On the other hand, the default premium in this
yield is likely too small except for unusually low loan—to—value deals. The
market rate for each transaction must be determined individually, depending on
the loan—to—value ratio, the term of the loan and the distance the interest
rate is below—market (the further below market and the shorter the term, the
lower the call premium), and the tax rate of the typical buyer of houses of
this type.(The latter, by the way, is the average rate the typical buyer who
has taken on substantial debt would be paying, not the higher average rate of
the typical holder of houses in the pertinent price range.)—3—
Our paper is divided into five sections. In thefirst we present a model
incorporating a dependency of the real prices of creativefinance and other
housing attributes on demand and supply conditions, and inthe second we
discuss the measurement of the quantity of creativefinance. Our sample of 162
sales in Columbus, Ohio over the 1979—84period is described in Section III,
and the econometric results are reported andinterpreted in Section Iv. A
summary concludes the paper.
I. The Model
The hedonic price model when applied tohousing is based on the
assumption that consumers value the components of a house suchas lot size,
structural characteristics and neighborhood amenities(Rosen, 1974). Total
value is determined by the quantities of thesecomponents and the manner in
which they are bundled into a package. The basichedonic model is easily
extended to include the seller's financingpackage as a determinant of house
value:
V =V(h,z),
where V is real house value (the recorded salesprice deflated by a general
price level), h is a vector of structural andneighborhood characteristics of
the house and property and z is the"quantity" of creative financing.3 The
implicit real market price (unobserved) of attributei is V/3h. =p.,and for




All the p's should, of course, be positiveassuming that the characteristics
are defined in a manner such that increased amountsyield increased utility.—4—
The Real Price of Creative Finance
The price of greatest concern in this study is the implicit price of
creative financing. At any point in time, this price is affected by specific
characteristics of the financing such as the extent to which affordability (a)
is increased or the initial downpayment or equity constraint required in the





We measure a as the percentage reduction in the initial monthly payment
achieved by the specific creative financing package. With PAYC and PAYO,
respectively, being the payments on the creatively and ordinarilyfinanced
loans,
a =(PAYO—PAYC)/PAYO.
PAYC depends on the specific package and PAYO is computed from the standard
formula.4 The greater is a, the more affordable is the house and thus the
higher is the price of a unit of creative finance 0). In the few cases
where a <0, it is set equal to zero because a buyer would never choose a loan
with a negative a if affordability mattered.
The minimum equity downpayment ratio in the private market is 0.05 plus




where LV is the ratio of the loan to the nominal selling price of the house.
The lower is e, the more the package has relaxed the equity constraintand the
more valuable is the package (3 <0).
The market price for a specific creative financing package shouldvary
over time with changes in the aggregate demand for and supply of creative
financing. On the demand side, we should look to macroeconomic counterparts (A
and E) to the a and e variables discussed above. The aggregateaffordability
index computed by the National Association of Realtors (the ratio of median
family income to FNMA's "qualifying income" based on an 80 percent loan—to—
value ratio loan on the median—priced existing single—family home) is the
obvious choice. The greater is affordability generally, the less valuable is
creative finance. Because the importance of the downpayment constraintlikely
varied little over this period, no macroeconomic E variable is introduced.
Identification of macroeconomic supply side variables is more difficult.
Owners will be more likely to provide seller financing if they can obtain
below—market funds themselves. Such would be the case if they had far below—
market rates on existing loans from institutional lenders who were willing to
provide short—term below—market loans in order to get long—term below—market
loans off the books. We define S as the difference between the new—issue
mortgage rate on loans closed at savings and loans and the average yield on the
existing portfolio of loans at these institutions.5 The greater is S, the
lower will be the price of a unit of creative finance. Continuingour
linearity assumption, we express the constant term in equation (2) as—6—
1=b1+b2A+b3S.
(3)
The Real Price of Housing
If the real price of housing were constant over the 1979—84 estimation
period, the p's could reasonably be treated as constants. However, the
general rise in both nominal and real after—tax interest rates during this span
suggests that the real prices may have declined. Two variables are tested as
determinants of real house prices: and the real annual rental cost of owner—
occupied housing, U, as computed by Hendershott and shilling (1982) and the
NAR's affordability index, A. Movements in the former are dominated by changes
in real after—tax mortgage rates; movements in the latter by changes in
nominal mortgage rates. Ideally, U and A would be interacted with all the h.
(all of the p. would depend on U and A); given our limited degrees of freedom,
we allow the real price of only the most important attribute, quality—adjusted





The higher is the annual cost of housing, the lower should be the price (p12<O).
The more affordable is housing, the higher should be the price (p13)O).
Using equations (l)—(4), our preliminary estimation equation is
V = + (p11+p12U+p13A)h1+'p.h.+(b1+b2A+b3S+2a+3e)z.
(5)
The implicit price of creative financing (the coefficient on z) depends upon
the levels of A, S, a, and e. The price will vary temporally with changes in A
and S and across observations at any point in time depending on the reductions—7—
in the equity downpayment and monthly mortgage payment offered ina particular
financing package relative to ordinary financing. As discussed above,we
anticipate>0
and b2, b3, <0. Also, we expectp12 <0and p13> 0.
II. Measurement of z
Contrast a balloon payment mortgage of maturity M, amount LC, and rate i
for the creatively financed loan with an alternative loan of thesame maturity
and amount but at rate o, the opportunity market cost of thefinancing. The





where PAYC and the time path ofLCt are defined by the contract. The after—tax
present value of monthly payments for the first M periods of the alternative
loan, which amortizes over N periods, is specified as:
MPAYO -OTLO
t
zo= t' t=l [1 + (l—t)oJ
where Lot =LC1[(l+o)N
—(l+O)t]/[(l+O)N—1].We specify M as the minimum of
the stated period of the loan and 8.1 years. Truncating thematurity of
creatively financed loans in this manner accounts for the high probability of
relocation or refinancing within 8 years of house purchase.6
The nominal quantity of seller financing reflects differences in both the
present values of after—tax loan payments and the present values of the
outstanding loan balances when the balloon comes due:7—8—
Pz =z—z+(LO—LC )/[l +(1)1M
0 c M M
To obtain the real quantity, z, we deflate bythe CPI—U xi (experimental
urban—based CPI) ,rescaledto unity in January 1979. This deflatoris also
used to obtain the real house value, V.
The tax rate is inferred from the real housevalue and a regression,
based on the 1979 Michigan Panel Study of IncomeDynamics, of marginal tax




The t—statistic suggests a quite systematicrelation. The tax rate used below
in the calculations of our discount varies from alow of 0.21 (real house value
of $20,000) to a high of 0.30 (real house valueof $80,000)
The most difficult task is specifying o. In general,we write
og +s+d+c,
where g is the risk—free yield of maturity equalto that of the creative
financing deal,
s is the servicing fee charged on regularfinancing,
d is the default premium that would be charged onequally—risky regular
financing, and
c is the call premium that would be charged onregular financing with
equivalent call risk.
We set s equal to 0.25% and vary d with theinitial loan—to—value ratio (see
Table 1). For LV5 from 80.1 to 95%, the premium is roughlythat charged by
private mortgage insurers, computed by spreadingthe difference between their
first year fee and 0.25 over roughly 5 years and addingit to the 0.25 annual—9—
fee (insurers raised these fees in late1984) .ForLVs of 80% and less we use
our estimate of the fee private lenders would buildinto the mortgage coupon
rate. For 95.1 to 97.5% loans, we add 0.20to the fee on 95% loans; for loans
above 97.5% we assume a full 1% defaultpremium.(As indicated in the Table,
the creatively financed loans in oursample are spread widely across the
spectrum of loan—to—value ratios, with roughlya third having LVs under 75% and
one—quarter being over 90%.)
The call premium is especially difficultto estimate because it depends
on both the maturity of the loan and the amountby which the loan rate is below
market. During the late 1979 —early1983 period, the call premium on apar—
value 30—year mortgage was roughly 1.5%(Hendershott, Shilling and Villani,
1983). Call would have less value for shortermaturity loans and for below—par
loans (those with coupon rates below—market).Table 2 indicates our presumed
values of call for different combinations ofthe maturity and distance below
market of special financing deals. No numberappears when the call value is
assumed to be zero.(For our sample, 10 loans have a ¼% call valueand 13
loans have higher values, spread aboutevenly from to 1½%.)
III. The Data Sample
A random sample of 90 creatively financedhouses was drawn from the
Columbus, Ohio metropolitan area. As asupplement, a sample of 72 non—
creatively financed houses was added, these additionalhouses paired with the
creatively financed observations. All creatively financedobservations are
land contracts available for public inspection.To be included in the sample
used in the empirical analysis, the landcontracts had to report sale price,
the term of the loan, a single interestrate, and monthly payment.
The rest of the sample was of transactionsthat were conventionally
financed and gave no indication of a loanassumption. Observations were
obtained by searching for a transaction withina one city block area of a—10—
creatively—financed transaction occurring at a similar pointin time. Because
of these constraints, matches could not always beobtained. Thus the
conventionally—financed sample is of slightly smaller size.The sample period
for creatively—financed transactions extends from August1980 to March 1984,
while that for conventionally—financed transactions is somewhat longer,October
1979 to May 1984.
One potential problem with the analysis of creative financingis the
inclusion of intra—family or other unusual transactions. Thesetransactions
could include a wealth transfer (gift) using the financing ofthe purchase of
the parent's house by the children as the vehicle for thetransfer. A number
of obvious intra—family transactions were deleted from the originalsample. In
addition, we deleted 5 observations with no downpayment,4 observations with
a>0.5, 2 with a(—O.25, and 2 observations where z/V exceeded0.3.
In the hedonic price approach, the quantities of structuraland
locational attributes of a house must be controlled for. Measuresof lot size,
the square footage of the structure, the type of attic and basement,the number
of plumbing fixtures, whether centrally air conditioned or not,the type of
exterior, the percentage of the house already depreciated (inthe assessor's
view), an index of special features, and jurisdictionaldummies were obtained
from the county tax assessor's office. Table 3 contains variable meansand
definitions, including the product of square feet and the fractionof the house
not yet depreciated.
IV. The Empirical Results
Table 4 contains three sets of coefficient estimates. These equations
include z along with the nonfinancial variables affecting real housevalue.
All variables in column 1 have the expected positive signs; the most—11—
significant are area (square footage) and the assessor's estimate of the
undepreciated fraction of the property. A more plausible model would include
the product of these variables, the quality—adjusted area, rather than the
separate variables. The adjusted R2 at the bottom of column2indicates that
such a model does indeed work better. Brick exterior, central air, special
features, the high—tax suburb dummy, and quality—adjusted area all have t—
statistics in excess of 2.0. The price of special features is of particular
interest to accessors. The accessor is asked to state the value of special
features in $100 units. The $117 estimated price of these units is not far
from the expected $100 value; moreover, in our final equation in Table 5, the
estimated price is $102.
The real price of housing (of the quality—adjusted square—foot
characteristic) is allowed to vary in column 3 with changes in the annual cost
of housing (the real after—tax mortgage rate) and in affordability (the nominal
mortgage rate). While movements in both of these variables suggest that a
decline in real house prices would be observed between early 1979 and mid 1982,
affordability has increased since mid1982, suggesting a recovery in real house
prices, but the annual cost variable has remained roughly constant at a high
level, suggesting real house prices would not increase. As can be seen, the
cost variable seems to be the relevant one, based on the relatively large t—
ratio (the affordability variable has the incorrect sign, but its coefficient
is very near zero). The cost variable rose from 0.02 in 1978—79 to 0.10 in
1982—83. Evaluated at the mean value of ADJAREA, this increase lowers real
value (V) by $6,000, or 14 percent relative to the mean real value inour
sample.
The z coefficient (p) in these equations is just over one half, witha
t—statistic of about 1½ (significantly greater than zero at the 0.10 level).
Table 5 contains estimates of the variable—p model in which all the
determinants of (A, a, e and S) are interacted with z (column 1). These—12—
estimates are not very appealing: only two of the determinants, A and a, have
coefficients with the expected signs, and only one of these has a t—statistic
greater than unity. The F value of the test of the joint (null) hypothesis
that the coefficients of all of the intereaction terms are zero is only 1.18;
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
In the face of these disappointing results, we were lead to reconsider
our linearity assumption. For example, the success of a given quantityof
creative finance in addressing the affordability problem might raise the price
of creative finance at an increasing rate. So might a reduction in aggregate
affordability. To test for nonlinearities, we have replaced b2Az with b21Az +
b22A2zand 2az with 21az +22a2z.
Given our hypotheses about 2 and b2, we




where A =71and a =0.1952are the means of the variables. The coefficients
in the second column of Table 5 are consistent with these hypotheses.
Moreover, the e and S coefficients are now very near zero. The third column
excludes these variables, and the equation F value rises to 1.86 which is
significant at the 12% level.
Based on these results, we have computed the sensitivity of to the
aggregate level of affordability, A, and to the ability of a given quantity (z)
creative—finance contract to address the affordability problem by lowering the
initial monthly mortgage payment, a. The middle row and column of Table 6 are
based on the mean values of A and a for creatively—financed contracts in our
sample. That is, on average, the income of the median income family was 71
percent of the income needed to qualify for a 80% loan, at market rates, on the
median priced house, and creatively—financed contracts lowered the initial
monthly mortgage payment by 19½ percent. The other a values are one standard—13—
deviation from the mean. The high A value isthe average of the affordability
index in the March—October 1980 period,just before the affordability crunch
really set fl;thelow A value is the average during the Junel981—August 1982
period, when affordability was at Its lowest level.Each of these values is
also approximately a standard deviation fromthe mean value of A.
The general contours of the prices in Table 6are quite appealing,
although there are some difficulties with the details.Going from left to
right across any given A row, a creatively—financedcontract of given quantity
has a higher price the more the contractaddresses the affordability problem.
For example, at the mean aggregateaffordability level (A=71), contracts that
lower initial mortgage payments little havelittle value, while those that
reduce payments by 30 percent (shorter contractswith a further below—market
rate) are worth more than their "book" value.Also, we see that given
contracts are generally valued more highly whenaffordability is a major
problem in the aggregate than when it is not. Acontract lowering the initial
mortgage payment by 20 percent (the middle column) is worthonly a few cents on
the dollar when affordability is nota major problem, but is worth 65 cents
when affordability is tight.
The estimates of p raise two majorquestions. The first is the low
average price of creative finance (0.60 in equation 1 of Table4; 0.66 at the
mean values in Table 6). Why are sellerswilling to accept less than a dollar
for a dollar of value and why don'tbuyers bid the price of a dollar of value
up to a dollar? One explanation of the seller's willingnessto accept less
than a dollar is that it may not cost sellersa dollar to create the dollar
that buyers are getting (Hendershott, 1982).If sellers are in a higher tax
bracket than buyers, then the after—tax interestloss of the seller is less
than the gain of the buyer; part of the loss isbeing paid by the U.S.
Treasury.8 Obviously, low taxbracket buyers and high tax bracket sellershave—14—
incentives to opt for seller financing. Also, sellers may have obtained
short—term concessionary financing terms from their lenders who were anxious to
get long—term, below—market loans off their books. Sellers would be willing to
accept 60 cents for a dollar of creative finance if the Treasury and lenders
are paying 40 cents of the creative finance dollar.
As for the buyers, one would not expect them to be willing to pay a
dollar for a dollar of creative finance, in the absence of a significant
affordability problem, because of the costs or risks for the buyer using land
contracts that would not be faced by buyers in the conventional market.
Examples include prohibitions against the seller taking out second mortgage on
the property and the risk involved in refinancing the balloon payment. Also,
major alterations could be prohibited or, if allc5wed, buyers may not be able to
reclaim the expense if they default.
The second question concerns the negative prices for low a's and sharply
negative prices for low a's and high A's in Table 6. How can prices be
negative? While contracts that do little to address the affordability issue
likely have little value and contracts generally will have little value if
affordability is not a problem in the aggregate, negative prices are difficult
to rationalize.9 We don't believe these negative estimates (which have high
standard errors).
V. Summary
Our methodological extensions of the existing literature were summarized
in the introduction to the paper, so here we discuss our empirical results
only. The first major result is significant sensitivity of real house prices
in Columbus to the sharp increase in the annual rental cost of owner—occupied
housing (the real after—tax mortgage rate) between early 1979 and 1982. This
increase is estimated to have lowered real house prices by 15 percent. The
second result is a relatively low value of the price of creative finance. On
average, a one—dollar present—value after—tax interest saving is worth only—15—
about 60 cents. This price appears to be quite sensitiveto both the aggregate
affordability of housing in the economy and the ability of aspecific financing
package to increase affordability.
The affordability of housing varies over time, with theJune l98l—July
1982 period constituting the least affordability inthe last quarter century.
During this brief period, creative financing packages that increased
affordability in a very significant way (reduced the initialmonthly mortgage
payment by 30 percent relative to that based on conventional finance)were
priced slightly above par. That is, the buyer was willing topay more than a
dollar to obtain below—market financing withpresent value of a dollar. In
contrast, buyers have not been willing to pay anywhere nearpar value for
creative financing since affordability problems eased inearly 1983. Moreover,
the more a given quantity of creative finance increasesaffordability ——the
more the discount is front—loaded to lower the initialmortgage payment ——the
higher is the value of the creative finance. To illustrate,the price of a
given quantity of creative finance appears to befifty percent higher if it
reduces the initial monthly payment by 30percent, rather than 20 percent.
Further, creative finance packages that lower the initialmonthly payment by
less than 10 percent seem to be worthless.
Unfortunately, the empirical estimates are not measured with substantial
precision and thus our evidence for the hypotheses tested isweak. While weak,
the evidence is not disappointingly so.Testing the hypotheses of this paper
required a cross—sectional and time series data set.Aggregate affordability
and the supply of potential creative finance loansfluctuate only over time,
while the observation specific affordability andequity measures vary cross—
sectionally. Ideally, one would have a data set of perhaps 200observations
(matched creative and conventionally financed) available ineach quarter,
yielding a total set of over 3000 observations for the fouryear period. Our
90 creative—finance observations yield avery small cross—section per quarter,—16—
resulting in limitations being placed upon the generality of approach in the
econometric analysis. For example, while variations in the rental cost of
owner—occupied housing should affect the real prices of all housing
characteristics, not only quality—adjusted area, our small sample size
precludes interacting rental cost with the other characteristics. Table 6
suggests the price of creative finance is non—linear in aggregate and micro—
level affordability, but a precise measurement of the non—linearities and
interactions among the variables affecting price requires a larger data set;
the results in Table 6 are about as good as one might expect considering the
sample size. Hoping for precision of the estimates in the tails of the
distribution of affordability is unrealistic given the sample size.—17—
FOOTNOTES
*Discussjons with Steve Buser have helped us to clarify some of thearguments.
The research reported here is part of the NBER's researchprogram in financial
markets. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those ofthe
National Bureau of Economic Research.
1.This point was first made by Hendershott (1982) and has been emphasizedby
Jaffe (1984) and Ferreira and Sirmans (1984). The call premium is not
accounted for in Rosen (1984) and Smith, Sirmans and Sirmans (1984).
2.Jaffe (1984) notes that the price of creative finance depends onsupply and
demand but does not generalize to a temporal setting where the price wouldvary
over time. Studies by Rosen (1984) and Smith, Sirmans, and Sirmans (1984)
avoid the issue by obtaining a sample that is close to being froma single
point in time. One explanation for the widely varying estimates of the price
of creative finance [generally in the range of zero toone, Jaffe (1984)], is
that the samples are from different time periods in which supply and demand
conditions varied markedly.
3.As an alternative to deflation, some studies introduce timedummy variables
where the estimated coefficients on the dummies then measure inflation in each
period. Other studies enter a general price index as a regressor (Clauretie,
1984). The problem with either of these procedures is the implication that
inflation has the same dollar impact on a $20,000 house as on an $80,000 house.—18—
4.More specifically, PAYO =m(l+m)NL/[(l+m)N_l], where inisthe current
effective mortgage rate, L is the size of the loan, and N is the typical length
of a conventional loan.For m, the FHLBB's effective rate charged by all
major lenders on previously owned houses is employed; N is assumed to be 25
years.
5.The data are for all mortgage loans at FSLIC—insured savings and loans, and
the portfolio yield is a monthly interpolation of a semiannual series.
6.Smith, Sirmans and Sirinans (1984) suggest that maximum maturity of creatively
financed loans should be the maximum truncation period that yields a price of
creative finance that is not significantly different from unity. In both this
study and ours, the result is four years if after tax measure of z is employed.
We reject this suggestion because we expected the average price of creative
finance to be less than unity (see pp. 13—14 in the text).
7.If the local property tax assessment practice based the evaluation of a
particular property's tax on the sale price of that property, then the after—
tax measure of the quantity of creative finance should include an additional
term reflecting the additional property taxes that would be due. In the
sampled area, the assessment procedure is based on the average estimated market
value of similar properties in the neighborhood. Because the value of creative
finance is not included in the assessed value of a particular property, the
formula in the text is applicable to our study.
8.If the buyer has a 0.25 marginal tax rate and the seller has a 0.40 rate, the
buyer receives 75 cents for a dollar of below—market interest while the seller
only gives up 60 cents. Thus the seller would accept 80 cents (60/75) for a
dollar's worth of creative financing.—19.-
9.Frorn the seller's point of view, the tax advantages of an installment sale
could be sufficient to lead to his being willing to pay toengage in a
creatively financed transaction. For example, if the seller had a discounted
tax saving of $5,000 on an installment sale of a $100,000 house (the
installment sale results in the final sale after the household reachesage 55)
and the cost of the deal was $2,000 to the seller, then at the margin the
seller would be willing to accept $97,000 for the house. That is, the seller
would accept a negative price of 1.5 (—$3,000/$2,000). However, the market
price would still be positive.—20—
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Table 1: Loan to Value Ratios and Default Premia
(percentage points)
LV d Number in Sample
less than 75 0.0 26
75.1 to 80 0.10 7
80.1 to 85 0.35 14
85.1 to 90 0.40 22
90.1 to 95 0.50 10
95.1 to 97.5 0.70 8
greater than 97.5 1.00 3—22—
Table 2: Values of Call Premium (C)
(percentagepoints)
Years to Maturity
g +s+d—1 1 1—22—33—4½4½—6 6—88+
less than .25 .5 .75 1.0 1.25 1.5
to1 .25 .50 .75 1.00 1.25
1 to 1½ .25 .50.75 1.0





Variable Definitions and Means
Sample
Variable Means Definition
LOT 8472.28 Square footage of lot size. In theempirical
work, the natural lag of lot size is usedas the
explanatory variable.
AREA 1272.07 Square footage of structure, approximatedby the
product of square footage on ground floorand the
number of stories.
ATTIC .09 Whether the house has a finished attic.
BASEMENT .77 Whether the house has a full basement.
AIRCQNrj .30 Whether the house is air conditioned.
FIXTURES 6.87 The number of plumbing fixturesincluding hot
water heater, sinks, bathtubs, and toilets.
FEATURES 24.36 An index of the amount of specialfeatures
including wood burning fireplace, recreation
rooms, patios, fences and pools. Each unit of
this index equals $100 worth of featuresas
judged by the assessor.
DEPREC 29.1 A depreciation factor estimatedby the assessor.
The variable utilized in theempirical work is UNDEPR =100—DEPREC;thus a positive
coefficient is expected.
ADJAREA 8.566 UNDEPR*AREA/100
COLUMBUS .65 A dummy variable indicating theproperty is in
the Columbus central city tax district.
SUBURB .11 A dummy variable indicating theproperty is in a
high tax suburban jurisdiction. Theomitted case
includes properties in low tax suburbsor in the
central city but outside of the boundariesof the
Columbus school district.
BRICK .12 The exterior is made of brickor stone.—24—
cont.Table 3
U .082 User cost for owner—occupied housing computed as
in HendershOtt and shilling (1982) using a 0.25
tax rate.
*
z 2270.03 A measure of the discount of the creative
financing package, including tax consequences
(standard deviation, s.d., equals 2269.4).
*
e .0582 The downpayment to house price ratio. If the
value is larger than .0625, it is set equal
to .0625 (s.d. =.0114).
*
M 4.64 The number of years until the balloon payment is
due. If the balloon extends beyond 8 years, the
value is set equal to 8.1 years (s.d. =2.64).
*
a .1917 A measure of the affordability of the house as
defined in the text (s.d. =.1092).
*
A 71.0 The affordability index of the National
Association of Realtors (s.d. =6.61).
*
S 4.41% A measure of the difference between the current
mortgage interest rate and the yield on the
existing portfolios of loans (s.d. =1.33).
*
o 13.86% The market opportunity cost of creatively
financed loans as defined in the text.
*
m 14.61% The closing rate on residential mortgages.
*
v 44012 The mean real price of housing, 1979 dollars
(s.d. =15904).
*
z/V .05 The amount of the creative financing discount
relative to the price of housing.
*




























































































Evaluated at mean values of e andS.
.0941
65.5
71
77.6
—.64
—.62
—1.14
.296 3
.62 1.20
.66 1.24
.14 .72